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6.　Labor Law/Social Security Law
X v.s. Y
Supreme Court 2nd P.B., June 8, 2014
Case No. （jyu） 2430 of 2013
1118 RODO HANREI 18
Summary:
 In the case that a worker, who has suffered an injury resulting from an 
employment-related cause and received a compensation pension under the 
Article 12-8 （1） （i） of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act 
（IACIA）, failed to recover from the injury within three years from the date 
of the commencement of medical treatment, the Employer shall be exempt 
from the Restriction on the Dismissal of Workers under the Article 19 （1） 
o f t h e L a b o r S t a n d a r d s A c t （L S A） b y w a y o f c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r 
discontinuance in accordance with Article 81 of the same Act.
Reference:
 Articles 19 （1）, 75, 81, 84 of the LSA, Article 12-8 （1） （i） of the IACIA
 
Facts:
1.　 The appellee X （Worker; a plaintiff of the first instance, and an appellee 
of the second instance） had worked for the appellant Y （Educational 
corporation; a defendant of the first instance, and an appellant of the 
second instance） after they concluded the Labor Contract with each 
other on April 1, 1997.  X had complained of symptoms such as 
shoulder discomfort around March 2002 and had been diagnosed as 
suffering from Cervico-Omo-Brachial Syndrome, then he had been 
absent from work intermittently after April of the same year.  From 
January 17, 2006, he eventually had begun a prolonged absence, and it 
was determined that his Syndrome falls under an injury resulting from 
an employment-related cause at the time of March 20, 2003, so that he 
is eligible to received the Medical Compensation Benefits （MCB） and 
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Temporary Absence from Work Compensation Benefits （TAWCB） in 
accordance with the IACIA. 
2.　 Y, on October 24, 2011, by reason that X could not return to work 
considering the course of time and his attitude, paid compensation 
equivalent to the average wage that would be earned over 1,200 days 
（Compensation for Discontinuation of the Medical Compensation）, 
and subsequently on October 31, sent the intention of dismissal to 
him.  In response, X brought an action seeking the declaration that he 
continues to hold the status under the labor contract. 
3.　 The decision of the first instance （the decision of Tokyo District Court 
on September 28, 2012, 1062 RODO HANREI 5） and the second instance 
（the decision of Tokyo High Court on July 10, 2013, 1076 RODO HANREI 
93） both decided that dismissal in this case should be invalid.  Y 
appealed against this decision.
 
Opinion: 
 The court quashed and remanded the case.
1.　 Provided that the IACIA was proclaimed and enforced on the same day 
as the LSA prescribing the duty of the employer to the Accident 
Compensation （AC） for the worker who suffered an injury resulting 
from an employment-related cause; that there could be detectable the 
correspondence relationship between the duty to the AC specified in 
Chapter 8 of the LSA and Insurance Benefits specified in the article 
12-8 （1） （i） of the IACIA; that the article 84 （1） of the LSA stated the 
employer could be released from the duty to provide AC in the case 
that Insurance Benefits （IBs） above were paid in accordance with 
IACIA; the aim of the IACIA and the details of both Acts, ‘IACIA is the 
system, subject to the duty to pay the AC prescribed in the LSA, 
granting IBs instead of the AC from employers in order to reduce the 
burden on them and to give workers as victims prompt and fair 
protection.  We could see such IBs based on the IACIA as benefits 
which the government on behalf of employers fulfills the duty to the 
AC by way of insurance….  In this way, we could say the IBs specified 
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in the article 12-8 （1） （i） to （v） of the IACIA are the alternative 
compensation to the AC of the LSA correspondingly.’
2.　 ‘The provision of the Compensation for Discontinuation （CD） enables 
employers both to discontinue the AC from then on by paying 
compensation equivalent to the prescribed amount and to be released 
from protracted burdens caused by medical treatment of injured 
workers.’  Hence, with the Opinion 1 said above, ‘the fact the IBs have 
been paid to a worker has been identified as being simultaneous with 
the case that the duty to pay the AC of an employer in accordance with 
LSA has been discharged,’ so that ‘it is impossible to say we should 
distinguish the application of the proviso of 19 （1） ［of the LSA］’ 
between the case ‘having discharged the duty to pay the AC by an 
employer’ and ‘being paid by the IBs of the IACIA.’
  　 　　‘We should understand, accordingly, that the worker who has 
received the MCB specified in the article 12-8 （1） （i） of the IACIA 
would be included in a worker receiving compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 75 specified in the article 81 of the LSA.’ 
‘Therefore we should conclude that, given the worker has received the 
MCB specified in the article 12-8 （1） （i） of the IACIA, but not yet get 
cured his injury within 3 years, his employer could assert to have 
applied the proviso of the Article 19（1） of the LSA, namely the 
exemption from Restriction on the Dismissal of said workers, by way 
of paying the CD stated in Article 81 of the same Act. 
  　 　　In this case, Y paid the CD for X…on the ground that X receiving 
the MCB of the article 12-8 （1） （i） of the IACIA had not yet been 
cured within 3 years after beginning his medical treatment, so that the 
dismissal in this case would not be in violation of the Article 19 （1） of 
the LSA.’  The court therefore decided to quash the judgment of the 
prior instance, and ‘to send this case to the original court so as to 
further have them re-examine the validity of Y’s dismissal in the light 
of Article 16 of the Labor Contract Act’
 
Editorial Note:
1. In recent years, the numbers of workers are increasing who suffer 
injury or disease, especially Mental Disease, and need a long medical 
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treatment, thus a lengthy absence from work. For their employer, it is 
presumably difficult to decide whether or when to return them to the 
workplace, though their injury or disease would be cured.  This case was 
concerned with the worker who suffered from, not Mental Disease, but 
Cervico-Omo-Brachial Syndrome and took absence from work for a long 
time, so that were dismissed by his employer.  The worker X was not 
within the scope, on the written terms, of the exemption from the 
Restriction on the Dismissal （the Article 19 （1） of the LSA）, which is 
restricted to workers who have received compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 75 of the LSA.  But Y, his employer, dismissed X on 
the ground that paying the CD enables Y to be released from the 
Restriction on the Dismissal on the premise that X was within the scope of 
the exemption.  Then, the issue was whether the exemption from the 
Restriction on the Dismissal could be applied, beyond express provisions, 
to the worker like X.
 The first and prior instance focused on the written provision and 
judged that the exemption from Restriction on the Dismissal should never 
be applicable to this case.  The Supreme Court, on the contrary, decided 
that where the medical treatment for a worker who has received the 
Insurance Benefits of the IACIA is longer than 3 years, he was essentially 
identical to a worker receiving compensation pursuant to the provisions of 
Article 75 of the LSA, and thus the exemption from Restriction on the 
Dismissal should be applicable to this case. 
2. The article 75 （1） of the LSA states “in the event that a Worker suffers 
an injury or illness in the course of employment, the Employer shall 
furnish necessary medical treatment at its expense, or shall bear the 
expense for necessary medical treatment,” that is, the employer should 
bear the AC. The IACIA, on the other hand, proclaimed and enforced on 
the same year of the LSA, obliges employers to pay insurance premiums in 
advance, and would provide the necessary IBs in case of the duty of 
employers to pay the AC arising.  Hence the worker ‘who suffers an injury 
or illness in the course of employment’ of Article 75 of the LSA could be 
received IBs by claiming benefit to Chief of the Labor Standards 
Inspection Office （Article 12 -8 （1） of the IACIA）.  In addition, the 
employer shal l be exempt f rom the responsib i l i ty o f prov id ing 
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compensation under this Act in the event that IBs are to be made （the 
Article 84 of the LSA）. 
 Nevertheless, the IACIA, after having been enacted, had set out 
different types of the benefits from the AC, such as （a long-term） pension 
benefit, and had enriched the level and content of the benefits compared 
with the AC under the LSA.  The injury and disease compensation pension, 
which is a particular type of benefit stated in IACIA, shall be paid only to ‘a 
worker who suffered an injury or disease resulting from an employment-
related cause,’ but would meet both requirements that （1） the said injury 
or disease had not been healed or been cured; and （2） the degree of 
disability due to the said injury or disease falls under a fixed grade of 
injury and disease, after one year and six months have elapsed after the 
commencement of medical treatment （Article 12-8 （3） of the IACIA）.  
3. As to the provision of dismissal, article 16 of the Labor Contract Act 
states that ‘A dismissal shall, if it lacks objectively reasonable grounds and 
is not considered to be appropriate in general societal terms, be treated as 
an abuse of right and be invalid.’  In addition to this article, the article 19 
（1） of the LSA states that employers shall not dismiss a worker during a 
period of absence from work for medical treatment with respect to injuries 
or illnesses suffered in the course of employment, nor within 30 days 
thereafter.  
 However, with respect to the worker who has been absent for more 
than 3 years, if his/her employer pays CD （Article 81 of the LSA）, which is 
compensation paid voluntarily by employers in the event that ‘a Worker 
receiving compensation pursuant to the provisions of Article 75’ fails to 
recover from the injury within 3 years from the date of commencement of 
medical treatment, such an employer could be exempted from the 
Restriction on the Dismissal above （the proviso of the Article 19 （1））. 
The subjects of the exemption are either the worker of Article 75 of the 
LSA or the worker who receives an injury and disease compensation 
p e n s i o n o n t h e d a y w h e n t h r e e y e a r s h a v e e l a p s e d a f t e r t h e 
commencement of medical treatment （Article19 of the IACIA）.
4. The judgment of the Supreme Court said that ‘IBs specified in the 
article 12-8 （1） （i） to （v） of the IACIA are the alternative compensation to 
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the AC of the LSA correspondingly.’  Indeed, as we saw in note （2） above, 
it does not misunderstand that IBs in fact take over the compensation 
based on the duty to pay the AC of the LSA.  However, when focusing on 
the relative enrichment of the benefits of the IACIA, we can also see that 
the IACIA have gone beyond the responsibility under the AC, so that this 
part of judgment （Opinion 1） would not be decisive for their conclusion. 
 Rather, the main issue we have to consider is the meaning of the 
exemption from the Restriction on the Dismissal （the proviso of the 
Article 19 （1））.  The legislators said about this point that it was ‘in order 
that prolonging unduly the labor contract shall be prevented as a result of 
the Restriction on the Dismissal’ （K. Teramoto, The Commentary of the 
Labor Standard Act, Shinzan-sha, 1998）.  Based on this explanation, it is 
important to think about whether applying the Restriction to a worker 
（thus X） who fails to recover from the injury beyond three years but 
cannot receive the injury and disease compensation pension results in 
prolonging “unduly” the labor contract.  The court, however, said little or 
nothing about the issue.
5. This case forces us to reconsider the aim of the regulation on the 
dismissal for workers with long-term illness.  For such workers, in addition 
to the dismissal regulation, it is equally important that they restore his/her 
ability to work and thus manage to return to the workplace.  We have to 
think how to assist their return to work appropriately.  This point is closely 
related to the review of the abuse of employer’s right to dismiss a worker, 
which the remanded court will examine, in which the court is able to 
consider not only substantial facts, such as the legality of the grounds on 
the dismissal, but also collaterally related facts, such as the process of 
reaching the decision and the appropriateness on their assistance toward 
returning to the workplace.  So, it is more suitable, for the issue like this 
case, to require employers to assist the return to the work for workers 
with a long-term illness through such an adjudicative process that the 
court could assess actively whether the employer provided enough and 
affordable support to his/her workers to return to the workplace before 
reaching the decision of the dismissal.
